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EVIDENCE
Motor Vehicles * Driving While Intoxicated * Section 4511.19.
Implied Consent
Aurora v. Kepley, 60 Ohio St. 2d 73, 397 N.E.2d 400 (1979)
0 N MAY 12, 1977, Mr. James Kepley was arrested for driving a motor
vehicle while intoxicated after police observed him driving in an erratic
manner. He thereafter exhibited difficulty in performing coordination tests.
At the Aurora police station, Kepley was requested and agreed to take
a breathalyzer test having been advised of the Ohio implied consent law.'
The test was administered by an Aurora police officer holding a valid "oper-
ator's permit" issued by the Director of Health.2 Two Aurora officers held
"senior operator's permits" but neither were present when Kepley was
tested.' At trial Mr. Kepley's attorney objected to the admission of the
test results' because the test was not "performed by a senior operator or
an operator who is under the general direction of a senior operator . . ."I
as required by the regulations of the Director of Health. The test results were
admitted into evidence and Kepley was convicted. The Portage County Court
of Appeals reversed the conviction holding that the regulation requires a
"senior operator" to be physically present when the test is administered
and as one was not present when Kepley was tested, the results were er-
roneously admitted.6
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed and held that a "senior operator"
need not be physically present when an officer holding a valid "operator's
permit" administers a breathalyzer test.7 The court reasoned that the pur-
pose of the regulation was to ensure accuracy by requiring at least one
highly skilled operator to maintain and calibrate the machine and periodic-
ally check the operator's performance at every facility where breathalyzer
tests are administered. This close supervision of the equipment coupled
with the operator's training in the proper methods of operation ensure
accurate results without constant supervision by the senior operator.
The Supreme Court interpreted the requirement of this regulation
so as to correct the literal meaning given it by the Court of Appeals. Pur-
l Oo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (Page Supp. 1978).
2 Omo AD. CODE § 3701-53-07(E).
3 Id. at (D).
4 Kepley's blood alcohol content was measured at .24%. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(B)
states that a person is presumed to be under the influence of alcohol if there is .10% or
more by weight of alcohol in a person's blood.
5 Omo AD. CODE § 3701-53-07(C).
6 Aurora v. Kepley, 60 Ohio St. 73, 76, 397 N.E.2d 400, 401 (1979).
7 Id. at 76, 397 N.E.2d at 402.
[7311
1
Bruggeman: Aurora v. Kepley
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1980
AKRON LAW REVIEW
suant to section 4511.19 proscribing the operation of a motor vehicle while
intoxicated and providing for the taking of the breathalyzer test, one of
the requirements for admissability of the results is that the test be adminis-
tered within two hours of the alleged violation.8 The Director of Health,
in formulating regulations,9 developed two permits in part to facilitate
testing within this time frame. The training requirements for "operator's
permits" involve only the actual operation of the machine and are capable
of being held by more officers than the more intensive training required
to obtain the "senior operator's permit."'" If it were necessary for a senior
operator to be present during every test, each police department would
require at least two officers with those qualifications to ensure that one
would be available every hour of the day for testing within the two hour
limit. Besides the unnecessary expense of training and then requiring both
an operator and senior operator to be present, this would involve needless
duplication of knowledgeable personnel during testing. Accurate results
may be achieved if the senior operator generally oversees the functioning
and calibration of the machine and the operator administers the test in
the manner in which he has been trained.
When breathalyzer tests are conducted according to approved methods
and by competent operators, courts have given favor to the use of the
results in criminal cases involving driving while intoxicated. The Supreme
Court of Ohio, in 1968, followed a growing trend in other states by recog-
nizing the reasonably reliable results of these tests on the issue of intoxica-
tion." In Ohio, before accepting the results as evidence, however, the prose-
cutor is required to affirmatively establish that: 1) the bodily substance
was withdrawn within two hours of the alleged violation; 2) that it was
analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the Director of Health;
and; 3) that the test was conducted by qualified operators." Most challenges
relating to these requirements are that the test was not administered ac-
cording to approved methods as in Aurora, but few have been successful.' s
The importance of having the test results admitted lies in the fact that the
8 This requirement also is stated in Omo AD. CODE § 3701-53-05(A).
9 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3701.143 authorizes the Director of Health to formulate meth-
ods for chemical testing and qualifications for those performing the tests.
10 Omo AD. CODE § 3701-53-07 requires three years experience in the operation of the
breathalyzer for both permits. The senior operator training is more extensive during that
time in that it also includes calibration and maintenance of the equipment. Both are sub-
ject to periodic on-site checks by the Department of Health and certificate renewal every
two years.
U Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121, 123, 239 N.E.2d 40, 41 (1968).
12 Cincinnati v. Sand, 43 Ohio St. 2d 79, 330 N.E.2d 908 (1975).
13 But see State v. Jones, 37 Ohio App. 2d 127, 308 N.E.2d 755 (Clinton Cty. 1973) (failing
to affirmatively establish that the body substance was analyzed in accordance with methods
approved by the Department of Health is fatal to admissability); State v. Miracle, 33
Ohio App. 2d 289, 294 N.E.2d 903 (1973) (testimony required to establish that the
test is administered in specific compliance with approved methods).
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statutory presumptions" of intoxication are thereby triggered which, though
rebuttable, 5 aid in convicting drunken drivers by not having to depend
exclusively on eye witness observation or officer interpretation of exhibited
performance of coordination tests." More significantly, having statutory
presumptions eliminates the need for medical testimony to interpret the
meaning of the breathalyzer test results. 7
With the constant problem of accidents caused by drinking drivers"
and the fairly reliable results of breathalyzer tests established,'9 judicial
decisions have upheld the statutory scheme providing for its use through
an era when rights of an accused have been greatly expanded. It has been
held that the breathalyzer test results are not testimonial but physical evi-
dence and therefore not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination." Thus, the accused has no constitutional right to refuse
to take the test,2 ' and the prosecutor may comment at the trial on his refusal
relying on its' probative value as to whether the driver was intoxicated
at the time of the incident.2 New York goes even further and says as
long as there is no compulsion to refuse to take the test, the refusal is
admissable at trial 3
Challenges on the ground that the test is an unreasonable search and
seizure have been unsuccessful" as well based on the language of the
United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California.5 If the test was
done in a shocking or offensive manner it would be violative of the Rochin"6
test for Due Process but this attack is of little value as the test results
140mo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A),(B),(C) (Page Supp. 1975).
15 State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St. 2d 190, 271 N.E.2d 245 (1971).
10 id. at 199, 271 N.E.2d at 251 by dicta says that this type of evidence is also admissable
to carry out the intended thrust of the statute.
17 Id. at 198, 271 N.E.2d at 251.
i8 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THIRD SPECIAL REPORT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH, 61-63, (June, 1978).
'9 Conley, Scientific Investigation of Intoxication, 11 CLEv.-MAR. L.R. 108 (1962); Clark,
Driving While Intoxicated - Implied Consent in Ohio, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 277, 280
(1968).
20 State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, 385 A.2d 1085 (1978); City of Piqua v. Hunger, 15 Ohio
St. 2d 110, 113, 238 N.E.2d 766, 767-768 (1968), citing Schmerber v. California, 348 U.S.
757 (1966) as controlling.
21 Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968); People v. Sud-
duth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401 (1967).
22 15 Ohio St. 2d at 123, 239 N.E.2d at 41. This is not true in all jurisdictions. Massachusetts,
for example, provides by statute that comment may not be made at the alleged violator's
criminal trial.
23 People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 107, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845, 849, 385 N.E.2d 584, 587
(1978).
24 Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 554, 479 P.2d 685, 697 (1971); State v.
Starnes, 21 Ohio St. 2d 38, 43, 254 N.E.2d 675, 678 (1970).
25 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
26 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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will be excluded on the lesser showing that the test was not conducted
according to statutorily defined methods. Courts generally hold that it
is not necessary to give Miranda warnings before administering the test
because there is no interrogation involved." Nor does the right to counsel
attach prior to deciding whether to submit to the test.2 Consent to take
the test, however, may still be negated if the accused was not properly
informed that he could refuse and the consequences of refusal29 or, in
some jurisdictions, that the accused may have another physician of his
choice administer an independent body substance test for intoxication.2
Asking a person to submit to a test must be based on prior legal arrest
in all jurisdictions. But even though driving while intoxicated is a misde-
meanor which requires either a warrant or police observation, Ohio courts
have upheld warrantless arrests as legal when the officer arrives at an ac-
cident shortly after it occurs; the driver admits he had been driving and
appears intoxicated; and the officer could reasonably conclude he had
been driving before the accident." An affidavit and warrant are required,
however, if the officer fails to see the operation of the vehicle and the driver
does not admit driving."2 It has been stated that even though a police of-
ficer didn't state that he was arresting the accused, the circumstances would
indicate he was sufficiently under the officer's control to put the person on
notice that he was under arrest." After arrest if the officer fails to give
a test upon the request of the alleged violator, it has been held that the
driver was not deprived of due process or any other constitutional right.
2
'
By facilitating the use of breathalyzer tests, courts and legislators
are seeking to deter drunken driving and recidivism to ensure future safety
on the highways through the punitive aspects of conviction. A fairly recent
trend in some jurisdictions to more effectively counter this continuing
problem 2  is providing a statutory alternative for rehabilitation and
driver alcohol education for those convicted. The Massachusetts stat-
ute," for example, allows the judge to grant a one-year probationary period
.7 15 Ohio St. 2d at 112, 238 N.E.2d at 767 (1968).
2
8Wiethe v. Curry, - Ohio App. 2d -, 325 N.E.2d 561 (Hamilton Cty. 1975); Robertson
v. State ex rel. Lester, 501 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Okla., 1972).
29 136 Vt. at 151, 385 A.2d at 1088 (1978).
30 State v. Creson, 576 P.2d 814 (Or. App., 1978). This was said to be an insufficient basis
for exclusion in State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St. 2d 190, 271 N.E.2d 245 (1971).
31 City of Oregon v. Szakovits, 32 Ohio St. 2d 271, 276, 291 N.E.2d 742, 744 (1972).
32 State ex rel. Wilson v. Nash, 41 Ohio App. 2d 201, 324, N.E.2d 774 (1974).
33 325 N.E.2d at 561.
34 State v. Urrego, 41 Ohio App. 2d 124, 322 N.E.2d 688 (Monroe Cty. 1974).
35 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Safety Bureau, "The Alcohol Safety Coun-
termeasures Program", 17-22 (pamphlet, 1971); U.S. Department of Transportation, "High-
way Safety 1978, A Report on Activities Under the Highway Safety Act of 1966 as
amended January 1, 1978- December 31, 1978", 14 (1978).
36 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 §§ 24(D), 24(E) (Supp. 1978) (West).
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to persons convicted who agree to participate in either an education or
alcoholic rehabilitation program. This approach may yield greater deter-
rence value and less recidivism than the punitive aspects of conviction
alone. It does, however, still depend on conviction which makes the breath-
alyzer test results instrumental in reaching the point where rehabilitation
may be considered.
To encourage people arrested of driving while intoxicated to submit
to the test every state, plus the District of Columbia,37 now has an implied
consent statute. Based on the theory that every motorist by driving on
the highways impliedly consents to take the test upon arrest for driving
while intoxicated, the statutory schemes sanction those refusing through
license suspension for varying periods of time up to one year.8 The legal
fiction of implied consent in this setting is of the same cloth as the non-
resident motorist statutes both of which are considered valid law."9 The
implied consent statutes are considered reasonable regulations capable of
state enforcement under its police powers to protect public safety. When
a person is requested to take the test he is informed of the consequence of
license suspension as an inducement to consent and the production of
reliable and relevant evidence for trial. To avoid any coercion in eliciting
consent, the statutes generally provide that upon refusal the test shall not be
given but that the police officer shall file a sworn statement to the Regis-
trar including the reasonable grounds on which he based his belief that
37 ALA. CODE tit. 32-5-192 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031-032 (1975); Aiuz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28-691(d), (e) (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045(d) (Supp. 1975); CAL. VEH.
CODE § 13353(b)-(c) (1971) (Deering); COL. REV. STAT. § 13-5-30 (1971); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 227(b) (Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 2742 (1974); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-1005, 1006 (Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261(d), (e) (1975); GA.
CODE ANN. tit. 68, § 1625.1(b), (c) (1972); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-155 (1968); IDAHO
CODE § 49-352 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 95 , § 11-501.1(d) (1976); IND. CODE ANN. tit.
9, § 4-4.5-4 (1975) (Burns); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.137-138 (Supp. 1976) (West); KAN.
STAT. § 8-1001 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 185.565 (Supp. 1976); IA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-667-
668 (Supp. 1976) (West); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29' § 1312(2) (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66 , § 6-205.1 (Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f), (g)
(Supp. 1976) (West); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 257.625(e) (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
169.123 (Supp. 1973) (West); MIss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-21-23 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 564.441 (Supp. 1976) (Vernon); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 32.2142.1-2 (Supp. 1972);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.16 (1960); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 262-A-69e (Supp. 1972);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 39.4-50.4 (Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64.22-2.12 (Supp. 1971);
N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1975);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04-5 (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (Supp.
(1978) (Page); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 753-4 (1975); OR. REV. CODE § 482.540 (1971);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 1447, 1550 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (1969); S.C.
CODE § 46-344(d) (Supp. 1972); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 32-23-10-11 (1969);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1045 (Supp. 1976); TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. § 67011-5(2) (1977)
(Vernon); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(c) (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205 (Supp.
1976); VA. CODE § 18.2-268 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE tit. 46, § 20.308(3) (Supp.
1976); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-3 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(7)(a) (1971) (West);
WYo. STAT. §§ 31-247.2 (d)-247.3 (Supp. 1976).
38 Ohio's implied consent law provides for a six-month revocation period.
39 Cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1972), upholding the validity of nonresident motorist
statutes.
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the person was driving while intoxicated, that the alleged violator had been
advised of the consequences of refusal and that he refused. 0 In twelve
states' the license is immediately suspended with provision for a post-
suspension hearing upon request. Other states, including Ohio, notify the
driver of the revocation and a procedure for seeking review of this action
which if he chooses to pursue will postpone the suspension until after the
hearing unless he prevails at this proceeding. In Ohio a time frame is
established so that he must seek his review within twenty days of the mailing
of the notice of the administrative action." The issues at the hearing are lim-
ited in all states to the narrow issues surrounding the incident and in Ohio
are confined to whether there were reasonable grounds for the police to
believe the person was driving while intoxicated, whether he was properly
advised of the consequences of refusal, and whether he refused." This is
a civil, administrative proceeding completely separate from the criminal trial
which has no res judicata effect on these issues4 though the two proceed-
ings actually do impact on each other. The prosecutor is allowed to com-
ment at trial upon the drivers refusal in Ohio,' though not in all states,46
which, because of the damaging inference to the driver, may be con-
sidered an additional sanction. Ohio also statutorily provides that the
suspension of the driver's license shall terminate upon the entering of a
guilty plea or being convicted after a plea of no contest to the charge'
apparently considering these equivalents to the taking of the test or, at
least, yielding the same result.
Implied consent statutes have been the subject of challenges on Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds for failing to provide
a hearing before revocation of the driver's license of one who refused to
submit to the test. This area has been the most controversial and, until
recently, least settled. State courts have consistently upheld"8 their statutes
' See generally statutes cited supra note 37.
"Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Rhode
Island, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico.
42 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4911.191(F) (Page Supp. 1978).
43 Id.
4 State v. Starnes, 21 Ohio St. 2d 38, 45-46, 254 N.E.2d 675, 680 (1970).
S5 Id. at 43, 254 N.E.2d at 678.
"Massachusetts provides statutorily that the Prosecutor may not comment on refusal in
the criminal proceeding.
47 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4911.191(I) (Page Supp. 1978).
4aBut see Schutt v. McDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1954) finding New York's
recently enacted implied consent statute (the first enacted) unconstitutional for failing
to provide reasonable safeguards against arbitrary action by the police and Motor Vehicle
Division. The statute was amended to require an arrest before requesting a person to submit
to the test, that police submit a sworn statement to the registrar attesting to the refusal, and
that some type of hearing be available to review the administrative action. In its amended
form this statute was upheld as constitutional and served as a model for formulation of
implied consent statutes in other states. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc.2d 271, 143 N.Y.S.
2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
[Vol. 13:4
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on this challenge considering the issuance of a driver's license a privilege
rather than a right and therefore subject to this type of regulation to affect
public safety."'
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court addressed the due process
implications of summarily revoking drivers licenses in Bell v. Burson." At
issue in the case was Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act"1
which provided for revocation without a hearing of the driver's license of
any uninsured driver involved in an accident unless he posted security in
the amount claimed as damages by persons harmed in the accident. The
court found that once a license was issued the important interest of the
licensee in continued possession is protected as property under the four-
teenth amendment so as to prevent a state from terminating it without due
process.52 To comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, the
court said a meaningful hearing appropriate to the nature of the case must
be afforded by the state before the termination unless it was an emergency
situation.53 The nature of the hearing necessary to satisfy due process under
the Georgia statute was deemed to require determination of whether a
judgment arising from the accident was reasonably possible against the
driver.
Since Bell there has been a split in decisions between federal and state
courts confronted with the issue of whether implied consent statutes that
provide for revocation of licenses before a hearing comport with the
requirements of due process. Federal courts have found such statutes un-
constitutional" based on the language of Bell that a driver's license is an
important protected interest requiring a hearing before revocation. The
courts have rejected arguments by the states that immediate revocation
is required under an emergency exception" in order to rid the highways
of drunken drivers observing that the reason for revocation is not that
the person drove while intoxicated but because he refused to take the
test. They supported this reasoning by pointing out that those taking the
test are allowed to keep their licenses until after a criminal trial regardless
'9 Robertson v. State ex. rel. Lester, 501 P.2d 1099 (Okla. 1972); Campbell v. Superior Ct.,
106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967);
Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 140 N.W.2d 866 (1966).
50402 U.S. 535 (1971).
51 GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-601 (1958).
52 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
5 ld., at 542.
54 Montrym v. Panora, 429 F. Supp. 393 (Mass. 1977); Slone v. Kentucky Dept. of Trans-
portation, 379 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Chavez v. Campbell, 397 F. Supp. 1285
(D. Ariz. 1973); Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973).
5 Only very unusual circumstances will justify seizure of property without a hearing. It must
be a situation where seizure is necessary to secure an important governmental or general
public interest, there is a special need for promptness, and the seizure is strictly controlled
by government officials. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92 (1972).
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of the blood alcohol level indicated by the test.5" A hearing prior to revoca-
tion is deemed necessary by the federal courts to allow the person an
opportunity to show compliance with the statute and because the person
cannot be restored for the period he was denied driving privileges if it
later is found the deprivation was wrongful.57
Based on the federal courts decisions, other states not providing for
a hearing were urged to amend their statutes,58 which some did,59 but
other state courts continued to uphold this statutory scheme against
due process attacks."0 State courts typically distinguish Bell as in-
dicating that the state interest in assuring an uninsured persons financial
ability to cover judgments arising out of accidents does not outweigh the
driver's personal interest in continued possession of his license." The im-
plied consent statutes, on the other hand, are deemed to represent the
more important state interest in public safety which justifies immediate
revocation with the availability of a later hearing." Some courts find that
the statutory scheme fits into an emergency exception for the reason that
prompt action is required to achieve this public interest.6' It is also said
that the statutes satisfy all that due process requires by providing the
alleged violator the choice of either taking the test or refusing, thereby
facing the penalty of revocation, and providing the availability of some
judicial review of the administrative action based on the police officer's
sworn statement."
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the decision of
the District Court of the Northern District of Illinois and held that, based
on Bell, a driver's license could not constitutionally be suspended without
a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is a lack of ability to
exercise reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle. The
Illinois statute 5 provided for automatic license suspension if the driver
had been convicted of three moving violations within a twelve-month
period and for automatic revocation after three suspensions within a ten
year period.6 The statute provided for the Secretary of State to schedule
56 354 F. Supp. at 202; 397 F. Supp. at 1288.
57 379 F. Supp. at 654-655.
- Comment, Motor Vehicles: A New Challenge to the Implied Consent Law, 27 OKLA. L.
REv. 525 (1974).
59 Kansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania.
60 Commissioner of Motor Vehicles v. McCain, 84 N.M. 657, 506 P.2d 1204 (1975);
Daneault v. Clark, 309 A.2d 884 (N.H. 1973); Jones v. Schaffner, 509 S.W.2d 72 (Mo.
1974).
61 Popp v. Motor Vehicle Department, 211 Kan. 763, 508 P.2d 991 (1973).
The Kansas statute, however, was later amended to provide for a pre-suspension hearing.
62 Id.
63 309 A.2d at 886.
64 506 P.2d at 1208.
6 5ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95V2, § 6-206 (1975).
66 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
[Vol. 13:4
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an evidentiary hearing within twenty days after revocation or suspension upon
the request of the driver. The issuance of a limited permit for commercial
use or in the case of hardship was statutorily allowed.6" The Supreme Court
in Dixon v. Love decided the issue of "the extent to which due process re-
quires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of some type of
property interest even if such a hearing is provided thereafter.""8 In re-
solving this issue the Court applied the factors enunciated in Mathews v.
Eldridge:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally re-
quires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and fin-
ally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail. 9
The private interest affected by the Illinois statute is, of course, con-
tinued possession of the driver's license. In light of the statutory provision
for hardship and commercial drivers, however, the Court found that the
private interest was "not so great as to require . . . [departure] 'from the
ordinary principle . . . that something less than an evidentiary hearing is
sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.' "70 The risk of erroneous
deprivation was found to be slight under the scheme and additional pro-
cedures unlikely to reduce such errors. The Court pointed out that here
Mr. Love was not disputing the factual basis of the administrative action
but merely sought an opportunity to argue for leniency. 1 In analyzing
the third factor, the Court distinguished Bell. The Georgia statute at issue
there was only for the purpose of obtaining financial security to satisfy
judgments against the uninsured motorist and represented a lesser state
interest than the important interest in prompt removal of unsafe drivers
from the highways at issue in Love.7" In addition to this strong state interest
as justification for Illinois' statutory scheme, the Court determined that the
availability of a pre-revocation hearing would impede the substantial public in-
terest in administrative efficiency in that by giving the driver the option
for a hearing and delaying the suspension until after this proceeding,
drivers would automatically request full administrative hearings as a di-
latory tactic.7" The Court, therefore, held that the Illinois statute was con-
67 Id. at Paragraph (c), (2) & (3).
68431 U.S. at 112 (1977), citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
69424 U.S. at 335 (1976).
7 0 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. at 113 (1977), citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343.
71 Id. at 114.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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stitutionally adequate under the Due Process Clause. The concurring opin-
ions in Love agreed with the district court that a driver's license could
not be revoked on an ex-parte determination that a driver is unsafe but
found that in this situation the state could automatically revoke a license
without a pre-revocation hearing after three separate license suspensions
within a ten-year period, where each suspension was premised on con-
victions of moving traffic violations and authorized by statute. 74
In Massachusetts, after Love, the Registrar petitioned the District
Court to reconsider its ruling in Montrym v. Panora"5 that the Massachu-
setts implied consent statute was unconstitutional for failing to provide a
pre-suspension hearing. Upon rehearing"6 the court applied the Eldridge
factors and found Love distinguishable because the possibility for irrepar-
able personal injury was greater under the Massachusetts statute; there was
more risk of error; and providing a hearing before revocation did not frus-
trate the state interest in public safety.7" The District Court reaffirmed its
earlier ruling whereupon the Registrar appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court was thus presented an opportunity in Mackey v.
Montrym8 to resolve directly the issue of the process due before revoking
licenses upon refusal to take a breathalyzer test and settle the split between
state and federal courts. The Massachusetts statute' at issue provides for
an automatic suspension of ninety days once the registrar receives the
officers affidavit stating the grounds for believing the individual had been
driving while intoxicated, that he was requested to take the tdst and that he
refused. Once the driver surrenders his license an immediate hearing before
the registrar is available to contest the issues of whether the officer had
reasonable grounds for his belief, whether the driver was under arrest
and whether the driver had in fact refused to take the test.s" The immediate
hearing involves only the hearing officer who holds the police affidavit and
the driver who may be represented by counsel. If the driver requests that
other evidence or witnesses be introduced, the hearing may be continued
until a later time. The decision of the hearing officer may be appealed to
the Board of Appeal, whose decision may be reviewed in the state courts.
The incident out of which Mackey arose began when Mr. Montrym
was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol after he had
been involved in an accident and police observed his unsteadiness, slurred
741d. at 116-118.
75 429 F. Supp. 393 (D. Mass. 1977).
76 Montrym v. Panora, 438 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1977).
77 Id. at 1159.
7847 U.S.L.W. 4798 (1979).
79 MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (Supp. 1976) (West).
80Id. at 24(1)(g).
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speech and a strong odor of alcohol. Mr. Montrym refused to take the
breathalyzer test upon arrival at the station but after speaking to his attorney
he sought to retract his refusal and submit to the test. The officer would
not perform the test even though only twenty minutes had elapsed since
the refusal. Montrym later claimed that his attorney and not the police offi-
cer told him of the ninety day revocation period for refusal. It appeared
in the police affidavit to the Registrar, however, that Montrym was properly
informed of this consequence. The charge of driving while intoxicated was
subsequently dismissed by a state court based on Montrym's affidavit that
he was denied a breathalyzer test after consenting to one within thirty
minutes of his earlier refusal. Montrym's attorney notified the Registrar
of the courts dismissal order but the Registrar nonetheless suspended Mon-
trym's license while advising him of his right to appeal. He was not notified
of the statutory hearing immediately available. Montrym surrendered his
license and sought an appeal which was scheduled for a little less than
one month after relinquishing the license. In the meantime, however, he
brought this action in the United States District Court where he prevailed
on his claim that he had been denied due process by not being afforded
a pre-suspension hearing.
Though the Massachusetts statutory scheme more closely resembles
that in Bell which the Court found unconstitutional, the Supreme Court de-
termined that Love was not distinguishable and upheld the Massachusetts
implied consent statute as fulfilling the mandates of the Due Process Clause.8'
The majority reaffirmed that a driver's license is a protected property inter-
est,82 and viewed the issue as the extent of process due under this statutory
scheme once again relying on the Eldridge factors. Their analysis under
these factors, however, inappropriately aligned this scheme with the Illinois
statute involved in Love so as to yield the same result.
Comparing the property interest involved under each scheme the
majority found that the personal interest involved is actually less substantial
as it involves suspension for only a period of ninety days as opposed to
a year or more under the Illinois statute. The Court also noted that an im-
mediate hearing is available upon surrendering the license in Massachusetts
where a hearing under the Illinois statute was not available for up to a
twenty day period. Once having established that a driver's license is a
protected interest, however, inquiry should not be directed at the length
of deprivation but whether there is an opportunity to be heard prior to
action by the state. The Supreme Court observed in Fuentes v. Shevin
that the factors of length and severity of deprivation are appropriate in
determining the form of a hearing but are not decisive of the basic right
s1 Mackey v. Montrym, 47 U.S.L.W. at 4798.
82 Id. at 4800, n. 7.
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to a prior hearing of some kind."3 Under the Illinois statute in Love, a licen-
see has three separate trials where he may properly contest each incident
before his license may be revoked. Three convictions is a reasonable
enough indication of being an unsafe driver so as to allow the state to sus-
pend his license to protect other drivers. Mr. Montrym, having at issue the
nature of his refusal for which he is being sanctioned, was never afforded
an opportunity to contest the written police affidavit before the suspension.
The Court's emphasis on the availability of the immediate hearing is un-
warranted as Mr. Montrym was not even informed of this. To comply
with the basic requirements of due process, Mr. Montrym, having at issue
the very reason for the revocation, should have been allowed a hearing to
contest this state ex parte administrative action before it occurred regardless
of the length of time for which the state may revoke or whether there is an
immediate post-suspension hearing. The Supreme Court required no less
in Bell and has traditionally opined that "no later hearing and no damage
award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the
right of procedural due process has already occurred.""4 This should have
been especially clear in Montrym's case where he successfully disputed the
matter of his refusal in his criminal proceeding and could likely have pre-
vented the revocation from occurring at all had he been given the oppor-
tunity.
The Court found that there was little risk of erroneous deprivations
under the pre-suspension procedure required by the Massachusetts statute.
Once again comparing Love, the Court viewed the basis for revocation as
similarly based on "objective facts either within the personal knowledge of an
impartial government official or readily ascertainable by him."85 The state
basis of revocation, the police affidavit, was deemed sufficiently reliable
to render the risk of error insubstantial. The "objective facts" in Love, how-
ever, were notices of three separate license suspensions following convictions
of moving traffic violations before a neutral judicial body as opposed to the
implied consent statute where revocation is based solely on notice to the
Registrar of the police officer's determination and recording of refusal to
submit to the breathalyzer test. The police officer is not an impartial gov-
ernment official in this context but more nearly an adversary of the licensee
who is placing at issue his version of the refusal. The Registrar cannot be
termed a neutral official as even the majority observed that he has no dis-
cretion to stop the revocation once the officer's affidavit is submitted.8" The
Court, in an earlier case, Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.8" gave credence to the
fact that a deprivation of property occurred on the basis of a sworn affidavit,
83407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
84 Id. at 82.
85 47 U.S.L.W. at 4801.
9Id. at 4799.
07 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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and by this decision seems to strengthen the idea that once an affidavit
exists a pre-suspension hearing is less likely mandatory as process due.
Though a sworn statement is credible evidence, it is not so unquestionably
reliable as to justify an ex parte determination that a person's property will
be taken from him.
In testing the third Eldridge factor, the state interest served by this
procedure, the majority found compelling the state's need to deter drunken
driving and thereby protect the public. This strong interest certainly allows
states to enact implied consent statutes under their police powers but can-
not be used to deny due process. The revocation of licenses under implied
consent statutes is based on refusal to submit to a test and not on driving
while intoxicated. Those submitting to the test are allowed to keep their
licenses and are not subject to the sanction of revocation unless it is im-
posed after a criminal trial regardless of the level of alcohol the test results
indicate. There is, of course, a strong state interest in having the person
submit to the test so as to gather the best evidence for trial. This interest
is achieved, however, by sanctioning refusal with the threat of license revoca-
tion and is not defeated by affording a licensee a hearing on the narrow
issues surrounding refusal prior to final revocation. This is clearly evi-
denced by the fact that thirty nine of the fifty one jurisdictions with implied
consent statutes allow the licensee a hearing upon request before his license
is finally revoked."8 It would seem that the majority in Montrym could have
easily determined whether allowing this procedure actually resulted in
the dilatory tactics they feared.s9 The majority of states, including Ohio,
have statutory schemes that more than satisfy due process after Montrym.
In view of the fact that Montrvm was a 5-4 decision and that the
analysis of the dissenting judges was more clearly in keeping with past
decisions regarding the process due before a state may deprive a person of
his property, the matter of the constitutionality of implied consent statutes
on this ground may not be finally settled and is worthy of future challenge.
It may be argued that Montrym should be limited to implied consent statutes
similar to that of Massachusetts involving a suspension period of ninety
days and the availability of an immediate post-suspension hearing as the
Court placed great emphasis on these aspects. Challenges to statutory
schemes allowing for longer suspensions without an immediate hearing
available may be vehicles for the court to either review the due process
analysis of Montrym or at least to limit its effect.
The implied consent statutory schemes are useful in deterring persons
from driving while intoxicated and in promoting highway safety and, there-
fore, deserve continued judicial favor when the statutory requirements
8 Twelve states revoke prior to a hearing, supra note 41.
89 47 U.S.L.W. at 4802.
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have been met. The potential societal costs in life and property capable
of being incurred by drunken drivers require legislative and judicial counter-
measures effective in limiting the dangers posed by them. In developing
and using these countermeasures, however, the gravity of the problem
should not overshadow the basic components of due process that are
mandated by the Constitution.
AMIE BRUGGEMAN
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